We make preliminary investigations into the model theory of DeMorgan logics, attempting to make a case for the worth of such investigations before tackling the plight of particular mathematical theorems in these logics. We demonstrate that Loś' Theorem holds with respect to these logics and make some remarks about standard model-theoretic proper- 
represents interderivability with respect to logic λ. It is our task in this précis to provide an account of the relation λ for the logics in Dem. We begin by making syntactic considerations.
Definition 1.
A signature is an ordered set σ = (C, F, R, σ ′ ) of sets of symbols C, F, R and a function σ ′ : F∪R → N mapping function and relation symbols to their intended arity. In this paper, we include the identity symbol as a member of R for any signature σ.
Each signature determines a language, L σ , built up recursively. First, a set of terms may be constructed by the following procedure:
• All variables x, y, ... and constants c ∈ C are terms.
• For n > 0, if each t i of n-tuple t is a term and σ ′ (f ) = n for an f ∈ F, then f ( t) is a term.
With the terms recursively defined, we may construct L σ :
Definition 2. A language L σ is the smallest set such that for all n > 0, n-tuple of terms t, and all R ∈ R such that σ ′ (R) = n, R( t) ∈ L σ and closed under the following:
• If ϕ ∈ L σ , then ¬ϕ ∈ L σ .
• If ϕ, ψ ∈ L σ , then (ϕ • ψ) ∈ L σ , where • ∈ {∨, ∧, →}.
• If ϕ ∈ L σ and x is a variable, then Qxϕ ∈ L σ , where Q ∈ {∀, ∃}.
We now give a characterization of each λ . Following [3] , we'll provide for • For all λ ∈ Dem, f • For all λ ∈ Dem, f λ ∧ (x, y) = x⊓y, where ⊓ is defined on H λ and x, y ∈ S λ .
• For λ ∈ {CL, K  , LP, FDE}, f
, where x, y ∈ S λ .
• For λ ∈ { L  , RM  }, we consult the truth tables in Figure 2 . From here, we can introduce structures and truth in a model. A structure
gives an interpretation to a signature.
Definition 4.
A structure is an ordered set A = (A, C A , F A , R A+ , R A− ), where
A is a universe of elements, C A ⊆ A is a set of interpretations of constants, F A is a set of interpretations of function symbols, and R A+ and R A− are, respectively, sets of positive and negative interpretations of relation symbols. By the definition of signature, the symbol = is a member of R, and we define = A+ as {(x, x) : x ∈ A}, i.e., equality has the intended, positive interpretation.
Any closed term t then has an interpretation t A in A.
• If t = c for some c ∈ C, then t A = c A
• If t = f ( s) for some n-ary f ∈ F and n-tuple of closed terms s, then
In order to ensure that in discussing some structure or other, it is capable of determining a λ-interpretation, we introduce the notion of permissibility with respect to a logic λ. A structure A is consistent if for all n-ary R (including equality), R A+ ∩ R A− = ∅ (inconsistent otherwise), and complete if for all R (including equality), R A+ ∪ R A− = A n (incomplete otherwise). The class of consistent, complete structures is permissible for all λ ∈ Dem, the class of inconsistent structures is permissible for LP, RM  , and FDE, and the class of incomplete structures is permissible for K  , L  , and FDE.
Finally, in order to give an accurate account of the quantifiers and talk about an element or tuple of elements satisfying a formula, we introduce the following:
Definition 5. The named counterpart of a structure A, hereafter (A, A), is the structure gotten from A by adding a constant a for each element a ∈ A.
Each structure permissible with respect to a logic λ then gives an interpretation of the language. For an atomic formula R( t) (including identities of the form s = t) and a structure A permissible with respect to λ,
It is easy to check that if a structure is permissible with respect to λ, the semantic constraints will ensure that no atoms will be given a truth value not a member of S λ .
Using the evaluations of atoms as a basis, u A λ can be recursively defined according to the following conditions:
We now are equipped to provide a definition of truth in a model. Definition 6. For a structure A permissible with respect to a logic λ ∈ Dem,
This leads immediately to a definition of consequence between sets of formulae for each λ ∈ Dem by claiming that Γ λ ∆ iff for every structure A λ Γ, A λ ∆. Furthermore, given structure A, we can speak of an n-tuple a ∈ A n satisfying an n-ary formula ϕ in logic λ by the condition that A λ ϕ( a) iff
Granted the above definition, we may also note the following equivalences between the claim that A λ ϕ and natural language:
This connection can be easily confirmed by glancing at the truth functions for the connectives and quantifiers, but will enable us to argue about modeltheoretic properties in plain language in the following.
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Given a definition of truth in a model, we may generalize some typical modeltheoretic definitions that will come into play in the following.
Definition 7. The theory T h λ (A) of a structure A with respect to a logic λ is the set of sentences true in A with respect to λ. Formally, T h λ (A) = {ϕ : A λ ϕ}.
We define a notion of isomorphism that holds for all DeMorgan logics.
Definition 8.
Two structures A, B are isomorphic (A ∼ = B) iff there is a oneto-one correspondence h such that for all constant symbols c, c
, and for all relation symbols
Such a generalization of isomorphism should be intuitively correct; for one,
. Furthermore, we easily see that ∼ = is an equivalence relation on structures. With these definitions in hand, we proceed to some more concrete observations.
Generalizing Loś' Theorem to the Case of Dem
We define a product structure i∈I A i in the following manner: First, the elements a ΠA ∈ i∈I A i are those functions taking arguments i from I and returning as value an element from A i . Tuples of such elements a of arity m are to be thought of as a sequence of such functions (a 0 , ..., a m−1 ) so that
That the semantics for the logics herein considered translate so swiftly to natural language constitutes prima facie evidence that they withstand the scrutiny of e.g., Quine's maxim that a "change of logic" is a "change of subject" in [9] .
Ai ( a(i)) for all i ∈ I. Relation symbols R are interpreted as having both extension and anti-extension; for a tuple a ∈ i∈I A i , we say that i∈I A i λ R( a) iff a(i) ∈ R Ai+ for all i ∈ I.
We define the reduced product of i∈I A i modulo a filter U ⊂ ℘(I), which we hereafter call A ♮ , 2 in the following manner: We first define an equivalence relation ∼ U by dictating that any two elements a, b ∈ i∈I A i are equivalent
The universe i∈I A i /U thus comprises equivalence classes {b : a ∼ U b} = [a]. Constants of this structure c
symbols R, including = 3 , are interpreted, again, as having both extension and anti-extension. n-ary relation symbol R and an n-tuple a Loś' Theorem in the classical case is the theorem that for any family of structures {A i }, indexed by set I, and ultrafilter U ⊂ ℘(I), the following holds for all sentences ϕ:
Loś' Theorem is useful classically, as controlling the properties of the ultraproduct in many cases reduces to a careful selection of the ultrafilter. In the case of the logics of Dem, the typical methods of constructing new models have the limitation of only either ensuring that some class of formulae are satisfied or preventing some class of formulae from being satisfied. The theorem in this context carries the benefit of not only determining which formulae are found in T h λ (A ♮ ), but also determining which formulae are not in the theory. The present task, then, is to demonstrate that the theorem extends to the logics currently in question.
Theorem 1. For any class of structures {A i } permissible with respect to a logic λ ∈ Dem, index I, and ultrafilter U ⊂ ℘(I), i∈I A i /U λ ϕ iff {i : A i λ ϕ} ∈ U for formulae ϕ that contain no occurrences of the symbol → Proof. A brief sketch: taking the literals as basis step, we proceed inductively by first showing the result holds for connectives ∨ and ∧ and then demonstrating its holding in the case of the quantifiers. We then provide an argument for the theorem holding for ¬ by cases, in essence, running through the negations of formulae of these forms. We then merely define → by means of the previous connectives for the logics FDE, K  , LP, and CL. As the truth function associated with the connective → is not definable in terms of these connectives in the case of L  or RM  , we'll have to treat these logics separately.
Call {i : A i λ ϕ} the Boolean extension of ϕ (hereafter ϕ ) and assume that ϕ ∈ U and ψ ∈ U . Then by the finite intersection property, or fip,
A cursory glance at Figure 1 reveals that ϕ ∩ ψ = ϕ ∧ ψ , and so ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ U . Similarly, assume that ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ U ; both ϕ ∧ ψ ⊆ ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ ⊆ ψ hold. Since U is closed under supersets, it follows that ϕ ∈ U and ψ ∈ U . Supposing that Loś' Theorem holds for ϕ and ψ, then we may see that
Now we demonstrate that this holds for disjunction as well. Assume that either ϕ ∈ U or ψ ∈ U . We know that ϕ ⊆ ϕ ∪ ψ and ψ ⊆ ϕ ∪ ψ , so as U is closed under supersets in either case ϕ ∪ ψ ∈ U .
Finally, ϕ ∪ ψ = ϕ ∨ ψ so the latter is also a member of the ultrafilter. Now, assume that ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ U ; this is equivalent to the hypothesis that
If the former holds,
we've established that ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ U implies that ϕ ∈ U . If the latter holds, then by maximality of U , I ϕ ∈ U . By the finite intersection property and the hypothesis, then, ( ϕ ∪ ψ ) ∩ (I ϕ ∈ U ), which, by distributivity,
Of course, ψ ∩(I ϕ ) ⊆ ψ and by the upwards closure of U , ψ ∈ U . Hence, if ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ U , then either ϕ ∈ U or ψ ∈ U . Again, if we assume Loś' Theorem holds for ϕ and ψ, then it follows
Suppose that ∃xϕ(x) ∈ U . Then for each j ∈ ∃xϕ(x) , A j λ ϕ(a Aj ) for some element a Aj ∈ A j . Let b ∈ A i be such that b ↾ ∃xϕ(x) maps i to a witness of ϕ in A i , and allow the value to be arbitrary otherwise. Then
, and hence the latter is likewise in U . Likewise, if, for
it follows that A i λ ∃xϕ(x) and hence ∃xϕ(x) ⊆ ϕ(b ′ (i)) , ensuring that the latter, by upwards closure of U is likewise in the ultrafilter. Again, if the
An analogous argument provides the result for universally quantified formulae.
Finally, we look at negation by an argument by cases. For a formula ¬ϕ, ϕ is either a negation, a conjunction, a disjunction, or a quantified formula. In the former case, if ϕ = ¬ψ for some ψ, then we note that B λ ¬¬ψ iff B λ ψ.
In the cases of connectives ∨, ∧, we appeal to the fact that DeMorgan's Laws hold in each λ ∈ Dem. Thus, assuming that the theorem holds for all subformulae and their negations,
gives us the result for formulae ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Finally, we look at the case of quantified formulae. We note that quantifier interchange is valid in all λ ∈ Dem, and assuming the result for all formulae of lesser complexity, we note that 
Proof. Note that given a structure A,
We first translate into the context of an ultraproduct by examining ϕ → ψ , the set of indices of structures A i such that the sentence holds in A i . We note that {i : A i L ϕ} = I {i : A i L ϕ}, and may translate conditions a)-c).
More precisely, the translation of the above point is that i ∈ ϕ → ψ iff
, and so these sets are equal.
Left-to-right, suppose that Loś' Theorem has been shown to hold for all subformulae of ϕ → ψ and their negations and that A
¬ϕ implies that ¬ϕ ∈ U . We note that ¬ϕ ∈ U ⊆ ϕ → ψ , and as U is closed under supersets, ϕ → ψ ∈ U as well. Analogous reasoning gives a similar result for condition b). Finally, we consider the case in which condition c) holds; in this case, we may appeal to the contrapositive form of the theorem and the hypothesis. A
implies that ¬ϕ / ∈ U , and so forth. Since U is maximal, this implies that
ψ ∈ U , and I ¬ψ ∈ U , and by
DeMorgan's laws, this implies that
though, this set has been observed to be a subset of ϕ → ψ , and by upwards closure we deduce that ϕ → ψ ∈ U . As cases a)-c) exhaust the conditions under which ϕ → ψ is true in A ♮ , we've demonstrated the left-to-right half of the theorem.
Right-to-left, suppose that ϕ → ψ ∈ U and that the theorem has been shown to hold for subformulae and their negations. Note again that ϕ →
element is equal to a finite union of sets, then at least one of these sets is also an element of U ; hence, the hypothesis yields the result that either ¬ϕ ∈ U ,
In the first two cases,
In the latter case, we note that this is equivalent to stating that ϕ / ∈ U and ¬ϕ / ∈ U and ψ / ∈ U and ¬ψ / ∈ U . Appealing once more to the holding of the contraposition of Loś' Finally, in the additional case for negation, note that A ¬ψ iff ϕ ∈ U and ¬ψ ∈ U . As U has the fip and is maximal, this is equivalent to stating that ϕ ∩ ¬ψ ∈ U , which we've established is equivalent to stating that ¬(ϕ → ψ) ∈ U . This completes the cases for negation, and hence the induction for Loś' Theorem for L  .
Theorem 4. For any class of structures {A i } permissible with respect to RM 3 , index I, and ultrafilter
Proof. We make the following observations about the interpretation of the logical connective → in RM 3 :
Translating, this implies that
Left-to-right, we assume that the theorem has been established for formulae of lesser complexity and that A ♮ RM ϕ → ψ. Then at least one of conditions a)-c) hold. In the cases of a) and b), ex hypothesi, ϕ / ∈ U or ¬ψ / ∈ U , respectively, and by maximality, I ϕ ∈ U or I ¬ψ ∈ U . Both these sets are subsets of ϕ → ψ , and hence ϕ → ψ ∈ U by upwards closure. In case c), ϕ and ψ are both true and false in A ♮ , which tells us that ϕ , ¬ϕ , ψ , ¬ψ are all members of U . By the fip, their intersection is also in U , and as this is a subset of ϕ → ψ , by upwards closure, so too is it a member of U . Right-to-left follows a similar adaptation of the L  case.
For the case of negation, note that A
Supposing that the theorem holds for subformulae and their nega-
But this set is equivalent to ¬(ϕ → ψ) , and hence the foregoing is equivalent to the claim that that the Boolean extension of the formula is in U . Thus the case of → and its negation are covered, completing the induction.
As an application, we may use Loś' Theorem the demonstrate that in any of these logics, the model-theoretic properties of inconsistency and incompleteness are general first-order, i.e., the class of inconsistent structures is not axiomatizable in a first-order language. In a finite signature, of course, inconsistency is first-order; for finitely many relation symbols P i (indexed by a finite set I),
, where x i and P i are of identical arity, A LP σ iff A is inconsistent. When moving to a signature of cardinality κ ≥ ℵ 0 , however, such a σ is not well-formed, as it will have κ-many disjuncts.
This does not, however, tell that no such σ exists; such a sentence for each signature may indeed exist, though it would be a consequence of such a property.
Loś' Theorem, however, speaks against the existence of any such sentence, or set of sentences.
Theorem 5. The structural property of being inconsistent in an infinite signature is not general first-order, i.e., there is no sentence σ that axiomatizes the class of inconsistent structures, nor is there an infinite set of sentences that does so.
Proof. We may take a family of inconsistent structures {A i : i ∈ κ} with infinite signature σ = (A, {P j : j ∈ κ}) with A = {a} such that the extension of P j in a model A i is P Ai+ j = {a Ai } if i = j and P Ai+ j = ∅ otherwise, and the
Now it is immediate that each structure is inconsistent; in general, A i FDE,LP,RM ∃x(P i x ∧ ¬P i x). Suppose that there exists a first-order sentence σ that axiomatizes the class of inconsistent structures. Just as in the canonical proof that the property of a field's having finite characteristic is not first-order, one can make use of Lós' Theorem to demonstrate that σ is not general firstorder. We first consider the reduced product A ♮ = i∈κ A i /U , where U is nonprincipal. Noting that ı∈κ A i is a singleton, it follows that the domain
e., the function mapping each index i to the element a ∈ A i .
It is clear that this structure is first-order consistent. Consider the diagram:
for no relation symbol P j are both P 
But for any candidate P j , the set of structures that make true this formula is either empty or a singleton; both are precluded from inclusion in U . Thus although ¬P j (a(i)) is always κ, and hence a member of U , a contradiction between two atomic formulae is true at only a singleton in the power set. Furthermore, any inconsistent formula ϕ constructed from such contradictions is finite in length, and as such ϕ is finite and hence not contained in U . As the theory is determined by the diagram, that the diagram is consistent ensures that the theory of the structure is a)
classical and b) non-trivial.
That the theory is first-order consistent means that A i /U FDE,LP,RM σ .
But by hypothesis, all A i FDE,LP,RM σ , which Lós' Theorem tells us is impossible.
Analogous reasoning over a similarly artificial set of incomplete structures yields that there is no first order sentence σ Inc that holds of all structures with incomplete theories.
Theorem 6. The structural property of being incomplete in an infinite signature
is not general first-order, i.e., there is no sentence σ Inc that axiomatizes the class of incomplete structures, nor is there an infinite set of sentences that does so.
Proof. Consider the family {B i : i ∈ ω} such that P As a further result, we may apply a simple, model-theoretic proof of compactness for the logics λ ∈ Dem, due to Malcev, desirable as no reference to syntax is required. We refer the reader to the elegant presentation of Malcev's proof in [10] and note that the proof immediately applies to all λ ∈ Dem without any generalization.
We can now move on to see how more entrenched mathematical theorems fare in the context of Dem.
Categoricity and Cantor's Theorem
We in this section wish to explore the general case of Cantor's Theorem and make some notes about categoricity with respect to logics in Dem.
Proof. Consider a structure in the signature of L , A L , in which A L is a singleton {a} and for all c, c Interpretations of constants and the value of any argument of the interpretation 4 Note that this result preempts the typical proof of the upwards Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Given a structure A, typically, one merely adds κ-many formulae of the form c i = c j for every i, j ∈ κ to the theory T h(A). By compactness, this has a model, and by the inclusion of the set {c i = c j : i, j ∈ κ}, it will have a model of cardinality greater than or equal to κ. One then uses the downward theorem to establish the existence of a model of cardinality κ. The problem is obvious; while classically, that A ′ CL {c i = c j : i, j ∈ κ} implies that A ′ CL c i = c j for all i, j ∈ κ, ensuring that |A ′ | > κ. But in FDE, RM, and LP, such an inference is unwarranted; that A ′ LP,RM,FDE {c i = c j : i, j ∈ κ} ∪ {c i = c j : i, j ∈ κ} is possible while |A ′ | κ.
of function symbols must be that element of the domain, and as all n-ary relations are both true and false of that element (or the n-tuple of that element), their extensions and anti-extensions will be identical.
We can look at these results to examine the plight of Cantor's Theorem that DLO −− is ℵ 0 -categorical. [3] provides an explicit construction that demonstrates that the result does not hold for RM 3 and Priest's Collapsing Lemma may be appealed to in order to provide an explicit construction for which Cantor fails in LP (and hence FDE as well). As we'll require the Collapsing Lemma shortly, we'll briefly give an example of the applicability in the case of Cantor.
Given a consistent structure A, we may define a congruence relation ∼ on A such that for any n-ary f A and a, b
We then partition A into A ∼ , consisting of the classes [a] = {b ∈ A : b ∼ a} and define interpretations of constants and function symbols in the following way:
we may interpret each m-ary relation symbols R so that for its extension,
and for its anti-extension, (
Collecting these interpretations together, we define
and call it the collapse of A modulo ∼.
Theorem 9. Collapsing Lemma
Proof. We refer the reader to [5] .
Corollary 1. The classical theory DLO −− is not ℵ 0 -categorical with respect to the class of LP-structures, nor is it categorical in any cardinality.
Proof. We take the classical model of DLO −− and produce two structures, Q
∼1
and
Consider the classical set of linearly ordered rationals (Q, <). Consider two intervals defined by parameters (a, b), (c, d) ⊂ Q such that Q CL b < Q c. We then define two equivalence relations, ∼ 1 and ∼ 2 such that for e, f ∈ Q, e ∼ 1 f iff e = f or e, f ∈ (a, b), and e ∼ 2 f iff e ∼ 1 f or e, f ∈ (c, d). We then consider the collapsed structures Q ∼1 and Q ∼2 . As both are gotten through congruence relations on a countable structure, they are at most countably infinite, and as 
, which in fact fails.
As DLO −− is not classically κ-categorical for any uncountable κ, the classical witnesses of the failure of categoricity in each such cardinality, as they are permissible for LP, serve to generalize this result for uncountable cardinalities in LP.
We can also examine the fate of Cantor's theorem in the logics K  and L  .
We first establish a result about categoricity of classical theories with respect to these logics.
Theorem 10. If some theory T classically is categorical in some cardinal κ and has no finite models, then it is κ-categorical in both K  and L  .
Proof. Consider such a T . By the Loś-Tarski test, it is a complete theory, so for every model of T A, n-ary relation symbol R, and n-tuple a ∈ A n , a ∈ R A+ ∪ R A− . It follows that the only K  and L  models of T are the classical, consistent ones. But ex hypothesi, T was classically κ-categorical, and so any two such structures of cardinality κ will be isomorphic.
From this, we may observe the following:
Corollary 2. The classical theory DLO −− is ℵ 0 -categorical with respect to the class of K  -and L  -structures.
Proof. Immediate from the theorem.
Some Commutative Properties of Ultrapowers
We now outline a failed strategy to weigh in on an open problem as of [6] and left open by [4] -whether every countably infinite LP-model of PA is the collapse of a consistent model of arithmetic, or an elementary substructure thereof. A negative answer to this problem was initially the target, motivating the investigation of Loś' Theorem. The strategy is modestly outlined; the structures it generates may be interesting, even if they do not solve the problem. We then go into more detail about why the strategy fails, as its failure is due to model theoretic theorems interesting in their own right.
[5] introduces inconsistent, finite models of arithmetic, with which we shall here concern ourselves. The so-called "cycle" models make true all sentences of Peano Arithmetic PA, though, of course, it may likewise make the negations of some sentences ϕ ∈ PA as well. These models are gotten by the Collapsing Lemma, generated by means of congruence relations ∼ n,p for natural numbers n, p. We partition the set N, the universe of the structure (N,
, modulo ∼ n,p by claiming that for a, b ∈ N, a ∼ n,p b iff both a, b < n and a = b or both a, b ≥ n and a ≡ p b. We shall hereafter refer to the structure N ∼ n,p as A n p for some n, p, as the general composition of these structures is bipartite: an initial segment of (consistent) elements of length n, followed by a single cycle of period p.
We briefly describe a structure i∈ω A n i /U , where U is a non-principal ultrafilter on ℘(ω). Such a structure looks like a single "tag-end" of length n, extended by an ω * -block on one end and an ω-block on the other. Beyond the limits of each end of this block lies an undifferentiated "sea" of further ζ-blocks of nonstandard elements; these blocks are not meaningfully orderable, as any element of any particular block is both greater than and less than the elements of every other block. It is most convenient to think of such as structure as a densely ordered cycle of c-many ζ-blocks, but these blocks may just as well be interwoven amongst each other, or stacked atop one another, or worse.
The conjecture forwarded in earlier drafts of this paper was that ultraproducts of such structures could be generated that were not the collapse of any classical model of PA. It is not clear that for any element a in a classical nonstandard model * N that such a i∈ω A n i /U is the collapse of * N modulo ∼ 1,a .
But this isn't to say that there is no such collapse; Theorem 11 shows that there is always such a collapse, albeit not a simple one.
Theorem 11. For any collection of collapsed LP-models {A ∼i i } indexed by a set I and an ultrafilter U ⊂ ℘(I), there exists a collapse ∼ I such that
∼I , that is, collapsing and taking ultrapowers com-mute.
Proof. We continue to denote i∈I A ∼i i /U by A ♮ , while denoting i∈I A i /U by A ♭ and ( i∈I A i /U ) ∼I by A ♭∼ . A few remarks about notation: when helpful, a subscript will be placed by an element a, e.g., a ∼ U , to reinforce that a is an equivalence class modulo that relation. More often than not, the domain from which the element is drawn will provide the context and such subscripts will be suppressed. Furthermore, our abbreviations for the ultraproducts omit mention of the ultrafilter whence they are constructed. It is important to bear in mind that U is taken to be common to all structures; by this we can transport facts about one into the other. Finally, when dealing with an n-tuple of elements, we use a ∈ b to mean that for all j < n, a(j) ∈ b(j).
We define ∼ I by claiming that for two a,
We must first demonstrate that this is an equivalence relation. To demonstrate reflexivity, we note that ex hypothesi, ∼ i is a congruence relation for all i ∈ I. This being the case, a
and is hence a member of U for any a. To demonstrate transitivity, we suppose that a ∼ I b and b ∼ I c, and hence that for some a ′ ∈ a, b ′ ∈ b, and c ′ ∈ c both a
Since ∼ i is assumed to be transitive, at every i in the intersection of these sets a
and by upwards closure of U , a
and thus a ∼ I c. Finally, to demonstrate symmetry, we merely note that as all
, and hence a ∼ I b implies
More tricky is that ∼ I is a congruence relation, i.e., that if for an n-ary function symbol f and n-tuples a, b
By assumption for all j < n a j (i) ∼ b j (i) ∈ U . By the finiteness of n and the fip, ∩ j<n a j (i) ∼ b j (i) ∈ U as well. Since all ∼ i are congruence relations,
, and by upwards closure, the latter is a member of
, and so this is just to say that a representative from each class are equivalent modulo ∼ i at almost all i's, i.e., f
We submit as candidate isomorphism the function h that maps a ∈ A ♮ to
To prove injectivity of h, suppose that h(a) = h(b). Then there is an a ′ ∈ a and a b ′ ∈ b and element c ∈ i∈I A i such that c(i) ∈ a ′ (i) ∈ U and
hence that a ′ (i) and b ′ (i) share a member at almost all indices. We recognize that a ′ (i) and b ′ (i) denote equivalence classes modulo ∼ i and so reason that
This, of course, implies that a = b.
To demonstrate surjectivity of h, consider an arbitrary a ∈ A ♭∼ , an arbitrary a ′ ∈ a, and an arbitary a ′′ ∈ a ′ . At each index, a ′′ (i) picks out an element a ′′ (i) ∈ A i , and there is an equivalence class b
Furthermore, consider the function b ′ mapping each i to the equivalence class
and, as ∼ U partitions this domain, is thus a member of some b ∈ A ♮ . The selection of b ensures that h(b) = a, and as a was chosen arbitrarily, this implies surjectivity of h. By the foregoing, we conclude that h is bijective.
We want to show that h is not only a bijection, but is an isomorphism.
We begin with constants. In order to examine c A ♭∼ , we first note that c 
Next, for an n-ary function symbol f and n-tuple a ∈ (A ♮ ) n , we must demon-
. Consider h( a). h maps this n-tuple to the
We may then ask what the extension of f A ♭∼ (h( a)) is; to that we answer that we may choose a representative c ∈ h( a) and consider that f 
, and so we may rewrite this as
Now we may finally turn our attention towards h(f A ♮ ( a)) and note that this is the very same set. As
is the set of all elements of i∈I A ∼i i that are almost everywhere equal to f
is the set of elements of A ♭ such that they are almost everywhere a member of this element. Thus h(f
, and we establish identity.
Finally, we simply demonstrate that for any n-ary literal R or ¬R, that an
For left-to-right, suppose that a ∈ R A ♮ + ; this implies that a(i) ∈ R
iff there exists a a ′ (i) ∈ a(i) such that a ′ ∈ R Ai+ , and hence this is equivalent to stating that a ′ (i) ∈ R Ai+ ∈ U . This in turn implies that for the equivalence class a 
Ex hypothesi, we know that a ′ ∈ R Given the definition of ∼ I and h, we conclude that h is an isomorphism. 
Such a result can be had for other methods of constructing nonclassical models more general than collapsing. In [1] , J. Michael Dunn offers a technique for the construction of 3-valued structures from consistent structures. His presentation formally differs from ours, and we in a sense bifurcate his result into an LP case and a K  case.
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Taking a pair of consistent structures A, A ′ and a surjective, operationpreserving homomorphism h : A → A ′ , we define the inconsistent structure determined by h,3A,
, and for n-ary R3
Given the identical homomorphism, we generate an incomplete structure3A
by retaining the universe and interpretations of constants and function symbols while defining an n-ary R3
The intuition is that in the LP interpretation,3A makes true R of some element b iff of something in its preimage under h is R true in A; in the K  interpretation, R is true of b iň 3A iff R is true of everything in its preimage under h.
Dunn offers a preservation theorem with respect to such constructions, which we split as follows:
Theorem 12. (Dunn for LP) For a structure3A determined by an operational,
Proof. We refer the reader to [1] .
Theorem 13. (Dunn for K  ) For a structure3A determined by an operational,
Referring to alternately3A or3A as 3A when the permissibility of the structure is irrelevant, we offer the following:
Theorem 14. For an index I and a class of either inconsistent or incomplete structures {3A i } such that each is determined by a function h i : A i → B i , and an ultraproduct (3A) ♮ = i∈I 3A i /U , there exists a function h :
such that the structure determined by this function,
Proof. We offer as candidate operational homomorphism h :
We must show that h is surjective and operation-preserving. First, for an arbitrary b ∈ B ♮ and a member b ′ ∈ b, as ex hypothesi all h i are surjective, there exists some
Let a be an equivalence class of elements of i∈I A i equivalent to a ′ : i → a i modulo U . As all a ′′ ∈ a are equal to a ′ at almost all indices, h i (a
We quickly see that the condition holds for any a ′′ ∈ a, b ′′ ∈ b, and thus there exists a preimage of b under h.
h is also an operational homomorphism. We now must establish that a 0 ) , ..., h(a n−1 )). First, we expand the former to see that it is {b ′ ∈ i∈I B i : b
this is just the set {b ′ ∈ i∈I B i : b
.., a n−1 (i))) ∈ U }, as A ♮ and B ♮ are reduced modulo the same filter. We may expand the latter as
.., h i (a n−1 (i))) at each i. Thus the two sets are identical.
The foregoing establishes that h is a surjective, operational homomorphism and thus determines a structure 3(A ♮ ). We now observe that (3A)
By the manner of construction due to Dunn, 3A i = B i , and hence (3A) ♮ is i∈I B i reduced modulo U . By the equivalent construction of 3(A ♮ ), we note
This isn't, of course, enough; we must ensure that id B ♮ also preserves interpretations. First, for a constant c, we ensure that c
, we rewrite this as {b ∈ i∈I 3A i :
As for all i ∈ I, 3A i = B i , we further rewrite this
∈ U , and so we may rewrite this element as {b ∈ i∈I B i :
Furthermore, we must demonstrate that f (3A)
, so we rephrase this as
so we rewrite this as {b ′ ∈ i∈I B i : b To demonstrate identity between the structures, we must treat the interpretation of relation symbols. We now split the cases of the inconsistent and incomplete structures determined by h.
In the LP case, an element (b 0 , ..., b n−1 ) ∈ R (3A) 
Concluding Remarks
From this point, I hope that we've gotten generalizations of a few fundamental techniques, and seen some applications suggesting that mathematics set upon a DeMorgan-logical landscape is something that warrants study. A few, concluding notes concerning future directions of such a study might be in order to further stress its worth.
One motivation may be made apparent by an analogy with the reverse math- Just as we cannot, e.g., prove Loś' Theorem without the axiom of choice, there is some logical assumption made classically that underwrites Cantor. If one may discover the precise location in this spectrum of logics at which some theorem fails this constitutes evidence that there is a correlation between, perhaps, some structural rule of that logic and the success or failure of that theorem.
It also may be hoped that transfer properties between the class of structures of a nonclassical logic and the class of classical structures could be established.
Such transfer properties have the potential to provide facts about classical mathematical theories. Just, for instance, as the fruits of non-standard analysis may be applied to standard analysis without the theorist accepting the accompanying ontology, so might we hope that transfer principles could very well provide useful, classical results.
Finally, [3] suggests a "special case hypothesis" that classical mathematics is a special case of a broader swarth of mathematics. This, it seems, goes beyond hypothesis to being a truism. The structures we herein describe are there, and in virtue of being describable, deserve study. We can play the pragmatist and outline strategies to entice the working mathematician, but the truth is that
DeMorgan logics have a model theory-surreal and curious as it may be-and its existence alone is sufficient to warrant its study. Even if one is inclined to think of it as teratology, monstrosities yet fall under the purview of the science as a whole. Regardless, the above introduces the use of ultraproducts as a viable method of constructing nonclassical models and establishes their "nice"
properties with respect to previously established techniques for constructing models in these logics. Motivations aside, this provides another tool in the nonclassical logician's armamentarium.
